The draft principles represent a necessary effort to translate the series’ analytical findings into policy-ready language. However, the current draft requires substantial revision to narrow the principles.

Cyber espionage encompasses a broad range of intelligence-gathering activities conducted through digital networks, spanning multiple domains. While these various forms share technological methods, they differ significantly in targets, perpetrators, and strategic objectives.

NATO is no longer tiptoeing around its enemies. The alliance now speaks and acts with a clear and distinct intention.

States spend a lot of time worrying about spies, and a lot of money trying to protect themselves from espionage. They construct multilayered personnel policies to keep untrustworthy individuals from government jobs that involve handling classified information. They invest heavily in complex information systems to block access to sensitive communications.

What are the costs of cyber espionage? And how do they differ from those of operations designed to prepare for attack?

In 2010, Stuxnet, a stealthy, sophisticated computer worm widely attributed to the United States and Israel, infiltrated Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment facility and sabotaged its industrial controls, delaying Iran’s nuclear program without a single bombing raid or overt military strike. A few years later, Russian operatives hacked into U.S. political organizations in 2016, stealing and leaking emails in an effort to sway the presidential election. At the same time, Chinese state-sponsored groups quietly penetrated foreign government and corporate networks to siphon off military technology and industrial secrets over many years. These incidents, though bloodless and often deniable, had clear strategic stakes.